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Gas Money Hookup Scam Case Analysis (Waplog to Telegram)

Fraud Mechanics of the Scam

This case exemplifies a **"gas money" romance scam**, where the scammer lures a dating app user with promises of an immediate sexual meetup, then invents a need for gas money as a pretext to extract funds. The **techniques and timing** used here are highly orchestrated:

- **Rapid Off-Platform Transition:** The scam started on Waplog (a dating app) but quickly moved to Telegram. Scammers often do this to avoid the dating app's monitoring and to gain direct, unmonitored contact [1] . Moving the victim off-platform early is a red flag and allows the scammer greater control (e.g., sending media, asking for money) without oversight [1] .

- **Immediate Sexual Enticement:** On Telegram, the scammer (posing as "Kimm") became **extremely flirtatious and explicit within a few messages**. Phrases like *"You horny too?"* and *"let's meetup and fuck rn"* appeared almost instantly. This fast escalation to sexual talk is intentional – it **lowers the victim's guard through lust and excitement**. The scammer promised an *instant hookup*, creating a sense of urgency and reward for the victim's cooperation. This is a psychological ploy: the scammer uses the victim's physical desires to override caution.

- **Promise of Instant Gratification:** The scammer suggested meeting **that same morning**, asking *"Where are you located let[']s meetup and fuck rn"*. When the victim provided a location (Roxboro), the scammer responded *"Drop addy[;] imma get dress[ed] and be on my way! Rn"*. By claiming to be literally on the way **"right now"**, the scammer pressures the victim to act quickly. The idea of an attractive stranger immediately driving over for sex is **deliberately surreal but tempting**, meant to rush the victim into compliance before they can think critically.

- **Introduction of a Financial Hurdle (Gas Money):** Once the victim shared an address and the scammer pretended to be preparing to travel, the scammer sprang the trap: *"Alright PayPal me $25 lemme get gas and be omw [on my way]"*. This is the **core scam mechanic** – a small, seemingly reasonable request (just $25) framed as *gas money* needed to come meet the victim. The amount is kept low to increase the chance the victim will send it without much hesitation. This scenario is essentially a form of **advance fee fraud** dressed up in a dating context: the victim pays upfront for a promised reward (the meetup) that never actually occurs [2] . Scammers on dating apps commonly use such excuses (gas money, babysitter fees, etc.) to solicit funds, essentially asking to be paid for the meetup/sex in a roundabout way [2] .

- **Payment Method and Tactics:** The scammer specifically requested the $25 via **PayPal "friends and family"** option. This is significant: PayPal's Friends & Family transactions have **no buyer protection** and are essentially irreversible. By instructing the victim *"use family and friends option"*, the scammer shows knowledge of how to get money with minimal risk of chargeback. Often scammers choose gift

cards or wire transfers, but in this case PayPal was used likely for convenience – still, the Friends & Family method makes it effectively a cash gift. The scammer provided their PayPal details (hidden in the chat export, but implied by *"Which account?"* and the scammer saying *"K lemme know if sent"*). They likely used an alias or stolen account for PayPal, adding a layer of anonymity.

- **Use of Flattery and Explicit Media:** Throughout the exchange, the scammer mixed the money request with continued sexual promises to keep the victim hooked. For instance, even after asking for gas money, "Kimm" wrote *"Hope u gonna lemme suck your cock before we fk?"* and discussed condoms vs. going raw. The scammer also sent photos/videos – the victim notes *"The video was a nice touch."* Sending an attractive **photo or video is a manipulation tactic** to build trust and excitement. These media were undoubtedly fake or stolen (part of the scammer's toolkit). By complimenting the victim (*"Handsome, love your beards"* after receiving his photo) and providing suggestive content, the scammer creates a *reciprocity effect* – the victim feels the scammer is "real" and interested, making them more likely to reciprocate by sending money.

- **Extraction of Personal Information:** Another aspect of the fraud is the attempt to gather personal info under benign pretenses. Here the scammer obtained the victim's **address** by asking for it to come over. This is sensitive information – in a genuine situation one wouldn't give out a home address so quickly. While the primary goal was money, having the victim's address could be exploited or sold. It also deepens the psychological hold: the victim has invested trust by sharing their location. Fortunately, the victim in this case provided a decoy address ("123 Depot St") instead of a real home address, which is a wise precaution.

- **Behavior When Challenged:** The scammer's response to resistance is telling. When the victim hesitated and cleverly asked for a personalized video (saying the scammer's name) as proof, the scammer became defensive: *"Wtf u saying[?] am dressed[,] u got my PayPal already"*. They insisted they were ready and not playing games: *"Not here for games"*. When the victim outright exposed the scam (sharing a scam awareness blog link), the scammer resorted to **anger and guilt-tripping**. They said *"Imma just undress and sit back home u ain't horny"* – implying *"I'll give up and leave; you're the one missing out"* – to pressure the victim into feeling remorse or fear of losing the opportunity. They also insulted the victim by suggesting *"You mean you're broke?"*, trying to flip the script and shame the victim for not paying. This mix of **aggression and manipulation** is a common tactic once a scammer realizes a victim is backing off. Scammers may attempt to salvage the con by making the victim feel guilty or insulted, hoping they'll prove they *aren't* "broke" or scared by sending the money after all.

- **Likely Outcome if Unchallenged:** Had the victim sent the $25, the scammer would **never show up**. Often, one of two things happens next: either the scammer disappears immediately, or they concoct another crisis to **upsell the scam** [2] . For example, some scammers after getting gas money might claim *"I'm on the way but I got a flat tire – I need $50 for a tow"* or *"The store won't take my card for condoms, can you CashApp $50?"*. In other variations, scammers ask for money for a babysitter or a hotel room, etc. [2] . It's effectively an **escort scam** without any real escort: the scammer is paid in advance and then vanishes or keeps stringing the victim along for more. As one analyst noted, *if you send money they'll just keep asking for more or go silent* [2] .

In summary, the fraud mechanics here rely on **speed, surprise, and lust**: the scammer wastes no time creating a sexual scenario and then injects a small monetary roadblock. The victim is meant to feel it's a

reasonable favor to grant (who wouldn't spot a potential lover $25 for gas?) and do it quickly before the moment passes. It's a cold, calculated operation exploiting human impulses.

Language and Profile Analysis (Linguistic Clues)

The scammer's **language use and writing style** provide clues to their background and tactics. Several patterns emerged in the chat:

- **Informal Slang and Texting Shorthand:** "Kimm" wrote in a very casual, **internet-slang-heavy** manner: e.g., *"imma"* (I'm gonna), *"u"* (you), *"rn"* (right now), *"addy"* (address), *"lemme"* (let me), etc. This was likely an attempt to sound like a young, fluent native English speaker who is comfortable with hookup culture. For instance, the phrase *"Drop addy imma get dress and be On my way! Rn"* packs multiple slang elements and a sense of urgency. The use of *"drop addy"* (slang for "give me your address") is particularly **American teen/20s slang**, suggesting the persona of a young adult.

- **Over-casual or Misused Idioms:** The scammer said things like *"Not here for games"* (meaning they are serious, not toying around) and used sexual slang very freely. While these particular phrases are common in casual speech, seeing them from a **stranger in a first conversation** can be jarring. A genuine person typically wouldn't jump to *"I want a boyfriend that gonna fuck me now and always"* in the first hour of chat – this kind of extreme forwardness is itself a linguistic red flag, indicating a *script* rather than a real personality. It's designed to fast-track the interaction to the scam's goal.

- **Grammar and Spelling Errors:** Despite the heavy use of slang, **grammatical mistakes** slipped through that hint the scammer is not actually a native speaker or is at least not well-educated in English. Examples include: *"imma get dress"* (missing the past participle "dressed"), *"wtf u saying am dressed"* (missing the pronoun "I" – it should be "I'm dressed"), or *"I don't understand what u talking about"* (missing "you're"). They also typed *"Oka[y] se using families and friends option"*, apparently meaning "Okay, use friends and family option" – a clumsy construction. Later, the scammer said *"Like I said fucking lost"* which doesn't properly fit any normal expression (possibly they meant *"you're lost"* or *"you're a f*ing lost cause", but it came out oddly). Another line,** "Literally here in search of boyfriend that gonna fuck me now and always"*, lacks proper pronouns and verb agreement (a native speaker would phrase this very differently, if they said it at all). These errors are strong indicators of a** non-native English speaker** behind the keyboard [3] . Law enforcement and fraud experts note that many romance scammers operate from outside the U.S., and their messages often contain grammatical errors and unnatural phrasing as a result [3] .

- **Possible Geographic Linguistic Hints:** Some of the grammar quirks, particularly the omission of "I" in *"am dressed"* and *"am [doing X]"*, are commonly seen in scammers from West Africa (for example, Nigerian scam communications often drop the pronoun "I") – it's a known pattern in scam linguistics. Moreover, the mix of text-speak and mistakes could suggest someone who learned English as a second language and picked up **slang from online sources** or previous victims. It is consistent with scammers located overseas who try to imitate an American dialect but aren't 100% fluent. In fact, many Telegram romance scammers are reported to be based in places like **Nigeria, Ghana, or the Philippines**, using English as a lingua franca to target Americans [4] . The persona "Kimm" purported to be in the victim's area (enough to drive over), but the *writing style betrays that this was likely a fabrication*. The scammer's **lack of local linguistic nuance** (beyond generic slang) and the errors in their text strongly suggest an overseas origin.

- **Tone and Consistency:** Throughout the chat, the scammer maintained a **single-minded focus on sex and money**. The tone shifted only when the scam started failing. Initially it was lustful and upbeat; when pressed for proof, it turned defensive/angry. Notably, the scammer did not use any endearments or personal questions (e.g., no "How was your day?" or pet names like "honey" or "dear"). Romance scammers often either use **too many endearments** (in longer cons) or, in cases like this, keep the interaction very transactional. The bluntness (*"you horny?"*, *"gonna suck your cock"*) is a deliberate style to *fast-forward* the intimacy. It's not how a genuine person would usually speak to someone they just met online – this dissonance in language can tip off an attentive target that something is wrong.

- **Response Timing and Scripted Feel:** The scammer's messages came quickly and addressed the victim's responses in a basic way, suggesting possibly a semi-scripted approach. For example, after the victim gave his location, the immediate reply was *"Send pic"* followed by instant praise *"Handsome love your beards"*. Each step of the conversation followed a **predictable script**: greet → establish lust → get location → request pic → arrange meeting → ask for money. The language used at each step seems pre-planned (aside from some typos). When the victim deviated from the expected script (by asking for a personalized video), the scammer's **comprehension faltered** – they responded with confusion and repetition (*"u got my PayPal already"*), indicating they weren't prepared for that request linguistically or tactically.

In summary, the scammer's language was a **mix of calculated persona and slips in proficiency**. The heavy slang and sexual crudeness were meant to paint a picture of a young, impulsive local woman, but the grammatical errors and odd phrasing suggest an imposter likely from abroad. Such inconsistency is often a giveaway: as the Los Angeles County Consumer & Business Affairs office warns, *be wary of bad grammar in online romances – often the scammer is overseas* [3] . In this case, the linguistic evidence aligns with that warning.

Timeline and Escalation of the Scam

The progression from first contact to scam attempt was **extremely fast** – a hallmark of this scam scenario. Below is a breakdown of how quickly the conversation escalated and the key turning points:

- **Initial Contact (Dating App to Telegram):** The interaction likely began on Waplog with a match or message. Very little time was spent on Waplog itself. The scammer convinced the victim to **switch to Telegram early** – possibly claiming it's easier to chat there or some excuse. This happened presumably on the same day. (Moving to a private chat app within hours of meeting is a red flag on its own [1] , as legitimate users usually stay on the dating platform longer or at least establish trust first.)

- **Start of Telegram Chat (10:20 AM):** The exported Telegram chat shows it began around 10:20 AM. The victim's first Telegram message was *"Hey there, Nick here"*. Essentially, the conversation on Telegram opened with a greeting/introduction from the victim confirming who they are (coming from Waplog).

- **First Few Minutes – Flirtation and Meeting Setup: By 10:20–10:21 AM**, just a few messages in, the scammer turned the chat sexual. They asked if the victim was horny too and immediately proposed

meeting up for sex *"rn" (right now)*. The **escalation from "hello" to "let's fuck" occurred literally within a couple of minutes**. The victim, playing along, indicated interest (*"Always [horny]"* and provided his location "Roxboro"). The scammer then asked for a photo, which the victim sent. By **10:21 AM**, the scammer was complimenting his looks and asking whether he can host or if they should meet elsewhere. The victim said he can host. The scammer replied with *"Drop [your address], I'm getting dressed and will be on my way right now."* This is the peak of the **lure phase**: within perhaps 5–10 textual exchanges, the scammer created the expectation of an imminent meeting.

• **Scam Request Introduced (~10:21–10:22 AM):** Immediately after the victim sent an address, the scammer claimed they'd *"check how far"* it is – then, without missing a beat, brought up gas money. The victim mentioned having PayPal (possibly anticipating the ask), and the scammer pounced: *"Alright, PayPal me $25, lemme get gas and be on my way."* This message came only **a minute or two after the address was given**, showing how fast the transition from flirty banter to **financial demand** happened. The timing is critical – the scammer waited until the victim was presumably excited and committed (they had even given an address, indicating trust) to drop the money request. In a genuine relationship, asking for money this early would be absurd, but scammers rely on the victim's clouded judgment at that heated moment.

• **Post-Request – Continued Pressure (10:22–10:25 AM):** The victim asked *"Which account?"* to send the money, appearing to cooperate. The scammer continued the sexual narrative while presumably sending PayPal details: they said *"Hope u gonna lemme suck your cock before we fk?"* and asked about condoms vs. raw sex. The victim responded in kind (still acting compliant). The scammer then emphasized using *Friends and Family* on PayPal and said *"K lemme know if [it's] sent."* At this stage (roughly 10:25 or so), the scammer believed the con was succeeding – they were **waiting for a payment confirmation**. During these few minutes, the scammer even sent a provocative video to maintain the victim's excitement (the victim commented *"The video was a nice touch"*). This is a **crucial escalation point**: the scammer keeps the momentum (sexy video, urgent language like "I'm dressed waiting for u") to prevent second thoughts while the victim presumably is sending money. The **entire buildup from flirty opener to payment request took perhaps 5 minutes**, which is incredibly fast but calculated.

• **Turning Point – Victim's Test (around 10:25–10:30 AM):** Instead of sending money, the savvy victim tested the scammer's authenticity. He replied (paraphrasing) *"Sure, I'll pay, but first send me a video saying my name... I want a preview."* This was a tactical move – asking for a **personalized verification** that a scammer using stolen media cannot provide ⑤ . At this turning point, the scammer's script fell apart. Their response at 10:30 AM was agitation: *"Wtf are you saying? I'm dressed, you got my PayPal already."* They refused the request for a personalized video (which a legitimate person keen to meet might have obliged). Instead, they insisted they are ready and waiting just on the payment. This is where the **scam attempt effectively stalled** – the victim had not sent money, and the scammer was growing frustrated.

• **Confrontation and Denouement (10:30–10:52 AM):** Realizing the ruse was exposed, the victim openly called out the scam. He first responded *"LOL. You're kind of slow. You rushed too fast."* and shared a link to a scam-busting blog (the *"gas-money-hookup-scam"* article). The scammer feigned ignorance (*"I don't understand what u talking about"*) but the victim made it clear he knew what was happening (even quipping *"You should hire me as a consultant [to improve your scamming]"*). Over the next 20 minutes, the conversation devolved: the scammer tried a few last tactics (claiming *"I'm*

literally just looking for a boyfriend to fk me always" to appear genuine, then accusing *"You mean you're broke?"* to goad the victim). The victim continued to mock the scammer (revealing that baiting scammers is something he does for "fun" and blog content). By **10:52 AM**, the scammer made a final weak protest (*"I'm sure you're not here in Roxboro"* – perhaps suggesting the victim was also fake) and the victim simply replied "LOL". The chat effectively ended there, with the scammer giving up. The entire Telegram conversation lasted about **30–32 minutes (10:20 to ~10:52)**. Notably, the critical window for the scam (from start to money request) was only ~10 minutes; the rest was an unproductive back-and-forth once the scammer realized they'd been caught.

- **Escalation Speed:** This timeline underscores how **quickly the scam escalated**. The scammer didn't invest days or weeks cultivating a romance (as seen in traditional romance scams); instead, they went from initial contact to asking for money in a matter of messages. This "hit-and-run" style is common for hookup-money scams. It relies on the victim being impulsive or naive enough to pay almost immediately. As security experts warn, if someone you just met online is *"pushing you too hard… or trying to move off-platform too quickly"* and then makes *"requests for money"*, it's a huge red flag [1]. In this case, those red flags (fast off-platform move, instant intimacy, sudden money ask) all occurred in the span of minutes.

- **Point of No Return:** The pivotal escalation point was clearly the **money request for gas**. Up until that moment, the scenario, while odd, could seem *possibly* real to an unsuspecting person (attractive person eager to meet, maybe too forward but not impossible). The second *"PayPal me $25 for gas"* appeared, the interaction flipped from a consensual flirtation to an attempted fraud. A wary person would recognize this as the scam climax – and indeed the victim here did. After that point, the relationship deteriorated because the victim did not comply. If the victim had paid, the scam would have continued with either further demands or simply an abrupt end (scammer vanishing). The **escalation was abrupt and one-directional**: it went from 0 to 100 (money demand) and then collapsed when the demand wasn't met.

In summary, the scam's timeline was compressed and optimized for speed. Within half an hour, everything had played out. The scammer's strategy was to **strike while the iron is hot** – capturing the victim's interest and turning it into profit before the victim could rationalize the situation. As shown, the victim's quick thinking disrupted this timeline. For others, any request for money so early in an online encounter is a clear sign of a scam and should be a cue to cut off contact immediately.

Use of Telegram and Technical Anonymity

This scam highlights why **Telegram is a favored platform for fraudsters** and how they leverage its features to remain anonymous and scale their operations:

- **Anonymity and Ease of Account Creation:** Telegram allows users to sign up with just a phone number (which can be a prepaid SIM or a VoIP number). Scammers anywhere in the world can thus create a fake Telegram profile in minutes. They are not required to verify identity, and there's no public profile with history to scrutinize. This appeals to romance scammers because they can impersonate someone with little chance of being traced [6]. In our case, "Kimm" likely used a burner phone number to register Telegram, with a profile name and photo that were **entirely fabricated**. The profile likely showed an attractive woman's photo (either stolen from social media or from an

explicit content source) to lure victims. Telegram doesn't show if a number is virtual or which country it's from, so the victim had no easy way to know "Kimm" could actually be on another continent.

- **Lack of Moderation and History:** Unlike a dating app profile, which might get reported or show account longevity, a Telegram account is just a handle. Scammers exploit this — they can create **many accounts (burner accounts)** and if one gets blocked, they simply move to the next. Telegram does not have community vetting of profile information. Additionally, Telegram chats are private and encrypted, so the scammer can carry out the scheme without the platform intervening. In this incident, as soon as the conversation moved to Telegram, the scammer was free to send whatever content and requests they wanted, including unsolicited explicit videos and payment details, with **zero oversight**.

- **Global Reach with Local Pretense:** Telegram's global nature enables scammers from overseas to convincingly pose as someone local ⁴ . The scammer here, presumably not actually in North Carolina, could still act as if they were "on the way" to the victim's address. There was no way to verify their location – Telegram doesn't broadcast location. Scammers often use VPNs or international phone numbers to mask where they truly are. Many romance scams on Telegram have been traced to West Africa or Southeast Asia ⁴ , yet the scammer will claim to be in the victim's city. In our case, the only **"location" data** was the scammer checking distance to the provided address, which was just talk. By using Telegram, the scammer avoided features like GPS-based matching or verified profiles that some dating apps have. Essentially, *Telegram lets a scammer be anywhere and "next door" at the same time*.

- **Use of Throwaway Media and Possible Automation:** The scammer's strategy on Telegram appeared to be semi-scripted. They had a stash of **pre-made media** (photos/videos) ready to send. The presence of multiple video files in the chat export implies the scammer possibly sent a short sexual clip to entice the victim. This media is likely reused for many targets. Some fraud rings employ **chatbots or scripted responses** for initial messages, and while this conversation had a human touch (especially in responding to the victim's curveballs), it's possible that **templates** were used. For example, messages like *"PayPal me $XX, lemme get gas and be on my way"* or *"I'm getting dressed now"* might be boilerplate lines they send to everyone, with only the dollar amount or minor details changed. The typo consistency and the immediate, confident responses suggest the scammer (or group) has done this many times – effectively a **scripted routine**. While a fully automated bot would likely have failed when the victim went off-script, the scammer might have been a human operator who could improvise a bit, but primarily sticking to a well-practiced sequence.

- **Privacy and Self-Destruct Features:** Telegram offers features like message deletion, self-destructing messages (in Secret Chats), etc. In this case, there's no indication those were used, but had the scam progressed, the scammer might have deleted certain messages (like the PayPal address) to cover tracks or even asked the victim to switch to a *"Secret Chat"* (which leaves no server record). The export shows the content because it was a normal cloud chat and the victim saved it quickly. Scammers appreciate that **once they block the victim on Telegram, all their chat history can disappear for them**, and the victim cannot reach them or easily trace them. It's a very one-sided channel – perfect for hit-and-run fraud.

- **Multiple Identities and Impersonation:** Telegram allows **username handles**, meaning a scammer can use a fake name (like "Kimm") that isn't tied to a real identity. The account likely had a profile

picture of an attractive woman – which could be stolen from an Instagram model or even explicit content. As the digital forensics blog notes, scammers often use pictures of someone else and can even use hacked Telegram accounts to further mask themselves [7] . In our scenario, the scammer's willingness to send a sexual video suggests they have a trove of such content, possibly not of the same person as the profile photo (victims often don't notice slight inconsistencies in looks when arousal is in play). The scammer never offered a voice call or live video call, which is intentional – a live call would immediately expose that the person on the profile isn't real. They stick to edited, controlled media to maintain the facade.

- **Payment and Tracking Evasion:** By using Telegram to coordinate payment, the scammer keeps financial requests off the dating app (which could ban them for soliciting money). They asked for PayPal, which does leave a trail of an email or PayPal ID, but likely that account is under a false name or a money mule's name. The specificity of *Friends & Family* suggests they didn't fear revealing a PayPal ID because they trust the victim can't easily claw the money back [8] [2] . After receiving money, a Telegram scammer often immediately **blocks the victim** and maybe even deletes their Telegram account to avoid retaliation. Since Telegram allows multiple accounts, the scammer could then start a new identity for the next run. In this case, because no money was sent, the scammer eventually just broke off, but one can infer they would disappear right after getting paid.

- **Lack of Platform Accountability:** Waplog was merely the hunting ground; the real scam went down on Telegram. This illustrates a common cross-platform tactic – dating platforms might try to weed out scammers, but once the conversation moves elsewhere, the dating app has no visibility. Telegram, for its part, does not monitor content of private chats for scams. It relies on users to report accounts. Even if reported, scammers just re-register new accounts. **Technically, Telegram's design (privacy-focused, lightly regulated)** is a boon for scammers: they exploit it to run social engineering schemes at scale. They can also use features like **broadcast lists or groups** to solicit many people, though in one-on-one romance scams, it's often manual targeting. In some cases, scammers have bots scrape dating sites or social media for potential victims and then message them en masse on Telegram or WhatsApp. We don't see that explicitly here, but it's part of the ecosystem enabling these cons.

In conclusion, Telegram served as the **ideal crime scene** for this scam: it gave the fraudster anonymity, global reach, and tools to share seductive content and collect money, all while making it hard for the victim or authorities to identify who they really are. The scammer's technical methods were simple but effective – use a throwaway account, send convincing media, and instruct payment through an irreversible channel. This case underscores why so many romance scammers urge targets off mainstream apps and onto apps like Telegram: *they can more freely "be someone else" and execute their con away from watchful eyes* [6] . The victim in this case was tech-savvy enough to recognize this and even turn the tables (by documenting the encounter), but for many less aware individuals, these technical ploys make it very difficult to verify who they're really talking to until it's too late.

Sources:

- Los Angeles County Consumer & Business Affairs – *"Recognize the Signs of a Romance Scam"* [3] (on grammar errors and overseas scammers).

- Digital Forensics Corp. – *"Is Telegram Used for Romance Scams?"* [4] [6] [1] (on Telegram's use by scammers worldwide, anonymity advantages, and red flags like moving off-platform and money requests).
- Reddit r/Scams discussion – user Korrocks on gas-money romance scam variants [2] (describing the scam pattern of asking for gas/babysitter money and likening it to a fake escort scam).

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[1] [4] [5] [6] [7] Telegram Romance Scams: How to Catch a Scammer Right Now

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[3] Recognize the Signs of a Romance Scam – Consumer & Business

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